Startup Location, Local Spillovers and Neighborhood Sorting

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Agglomeration spillovers

- Firms co-locate partly due to agglomeration spillovers

Ellison and Glaeser (1999), Duranton and Overman (2005), and Greenstone, Hornbeck, and Moretti (2010)

- Some of these spillovers stimulate the birth and success of startups

Porter (1998), Henderson, Kuncoro, and Turner (1995), Chatterji (2009), and Chatterji, Glaeser, and Kerr (2014) Glaeser, Kerr, and Kerr (2015)

- And evidence show that these effect are very local and decay rapidly Rosenthal and Strange (2003), Arzaghi and Henderson (2008), and Catalini (2018)

Do they apply to Startups?

- Location is a difficult choice entrepreneurs face

Figueiredo, Guimarães, and Woodward (2002) and Audretsch, Lehmann, and Warning (2005)

- Public and private efforts recognize it while aiming for co-location of new firms

'Big Push'(Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 1989), SBIR matching programs (Lanahan and Feldman 2015), Startup X,Y,Z, Co-working and Acceleration labs

- There is still more to know about if (and if so, how) these spillovers affects startups Glaeser, Kerr, and Ponzetto (2010), Chatterji, Glaeser, and Kerr (2014), and Kerr and Kominers (2015)

Ideal Experiment

Twin startups in random locations



However, in reality we only observe chosen locations



Possible approaches

- Find real or synthetic counterfactuals

Greenstone, Hornbeck, and Moretti (2010), or Heblich et al. (2019) and Qian and Tan (2021)

- Use within geography variation

Arzaghi and Henderson (2008), Liu, Rosenthal, and Strange (2017), and Roche (2020)

Possible approaches

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This paper mixes both: distinction between neighborhoods and blocks

- Zoom IN: Block-level spillovers are identified within neighborhoods
- Zoom OUT: Sorting into neighborhoods based on entrepreneurs' utility maximization

- algorithm *cluster* blocks as a collection of *adjacent counterfactual* locations extension of (Ward 1963) to include adjacency constraints
- based on propensity score using historical data for each city and industry spatial version of (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1984)



- <u>exclusion restriction</u>: choices orthogonal to within variation of block attributes

Bayer, Ross, and Topa (2008), Liu, Rosenthal, and Strange (2018), and Roche (2020)



Spoiler Alert! - local (block) spillovers are important for startups

- elasticity revenue to average employment is .12 and to average revenue is .03
 - higher survival rates (.02) and lower moving rates (-.15)
 - rapid spatial decay is consistent with smaller estimates in other contexts



Spoiler Alert! - local (block) spillovers are heterogeneous across...

- industries: e.g. emp. effects in manufacturing (.8) / revenue in finance (.05)
- type of exposure: e.g. emp effects with occ similar (.14) / revenue with upstream (.10)



Zoom OUT: local spillovers corrected by sorting across neighborhoods

- <u>develop an extended Roy model</u> of entrepreneurs neighborhood selection correction a la Heckman: Dahl (2002), Mazza and van Ophem (2018), and Ransom (2021)



Zoom OUT: local spillovers corrected by sorting across neighborhoods

- <u>exclusion restriction</u>: entrepreneur's personal location preferences Michelacci and Silva (2007), Dahl and Sorenson (2012), and Rosenthal and Strange (2011)



Zoom OUT: local spillovers corrected by sorting across neighborhoods

Spoiler Alert! - Sorting into neighborhoods matters

- chosen neighborhood in 1st quintile, residence neighborhood in 5th quintile
- block spillovers are bias by ~20-30% => emp downward to .15-.18 but rev upward to .016-.019



Contribution

- Entrepreneurship: location attributes and startup outcomes

Figueiredo, Guimarães, and Woodward (2002) and Delgado, Porter, and Stern (2010);Dahl and Sorenson (2012); Chatterji, Glaeser, and Kerr (2014);Guzman (2019)

- Urban: fine geographies, spillovers vs. location sorting

Arzaghi and Henderson (2008), Greenstone, Hornbeck, and Moretti (2010), and Rosenthal and Strange (2011) Glaeser, Kerr, and Ponzetto (2010), Baum-Snow, Gendron-Carrier, and Pavan (2021), and Heblich et al. (2019) Duque, Ramos, and Suriñach (2007);Arribas-Bel, Garcia-López, and Viladecans-Marsal (2019) and Galdo, Li, and Rama (2019)

- Methods: ML in economics: clustering and neural nets

Athey and Imbens (2019) and Mullainathan and Spiess (2017); Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2015) and David, Savnisch, and Smith-McLallen (2018)



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Main data is EE with labor tracking, ownership structure and location

Statistics Canada - Canadian Employer Employee Dynamics Dataset (CEEDD)

- Universe of incorporated firms and workers for 4 major cities in 2001-2017
- Detailed location
- Firm labour tracking
- <u>Ownership</u> structure and owners characteristics

Every new firm is a startup?

- Measuring entrepreneurship is difficult (Decker et al. 2014)
- Distinction between institutional entrants and startups
- Startups are
 - 1. Active
 - With revenues, employment, and/or costs
 - 2. Really new
 - Not result of restructuring, new subsidiary or M&A
 - Controlled by <u>few</u> individual(s)
 - 3. With industry and location information
 - Single Location
 - No NAICS 1,2, 9

Startups are smaller and founded by more young females/immigrants

- Smaller than incumbents and other type of new firms

| End of first year | Incumbent | Startup | Inst. Entrant |
|-----------------------|-----------|---------|---------------|
| Revenue (2000 mm CAD) | 2.245 | 0.158 | 1.704 |
| Payroll (2000 mm CAD) | 0.648 | 0.055 | 0.287 |
| Employment | 6.73 | 0.75 | 3.39 |
| Alive within 5 years | 0.834 | 0.415 | 0.333 |

- Relatively founded by more young female or immigrant entrepreneurs

| | Incumbent | Startup Entrant |
|----------------------|-----------|-----------------|
| Female Controller | 0.195 | 0.262 |
| Immigrant Controller | 0.284 | 0.467 |
| Age of Controller | 52.10 | 42.35 |
| Industry Experience | 2.25 | 1.33 |
| Number of businesses | 1.72 | 1.92 |

Startups open in a residence or where incumbents are

- They open at residence of one owner (home-bias), or where incumbents in their industry are located

| Block characteristics | Incumbents | Startups | Inst. Entrant |
|------------------------------------|------------|----------|---------------|
| At home* | 44% | 63% | 82% |
| Firms in Same Industry | 6.83 | 5.25 | 10.22 |
| Total Employment Same Industry | 88.19 | 64.59 | 189.54 |
| Total Revenue Same Industry (mm) | 43.7 | 23.4 | 115 |
| Average Employment Same Industry | 13.3 | 6.5 | 23.1 |
| Average Revenue Same Industry (mm) | 2.8 | 1.1 | 5.5 |
| Alive within 5 years | 86% | 42% | 35% |
| Move within 5 years | 55% | 69% | 66% |
| Move and alive within 5 years | 53% | 30% | 31% |

Full Sample of Startups

New firms are spread across many industries

| | Calgary | Montreal | Toronto | Vancouver | # Startups | # Incumbents-Year | #Incumbents |
|-------------------|---------|-----------|-----------|-----------|------------|-------------------|-------------|
| 3 | 943 | 2,724 | 4,885 | 1,834 | 10,386 | 377,085 | 58749 |
| 41 | 999 | 2,882 | 6,377 | 2,815 | 13,073 | 518,074 | 74979 |
| 44 | 3,043 | 8,303 | 15,200 | 5,148 | 31,694 | 657,431 | 110609 |
| 48 | 4,262 | 6,275 | 22,646 | 2,980 | 36,163 | 517,711 | 86829 |
| 51 | 627 | 1,547 | 4,244 | 2,124 | 8,542 | 214,552 | 36934 |
| 52 | 3,092 | 5,925 | 10,066 | 4,494 | 23,577 | 786,241 | 110614 |
| 53 | 3,313 | 7,082 | 10,480 | 6,010 | 26,885 | 858,064 | 124684 |
| 54 | 19,479 | 14,090 | 46,022 | 14,418 | 94,009 | 1,725,843 | 265428 |
| 55 | 1,122 | 1,848 | 4,345 | 1,708 | 9,023 | 439,544 | 55964 |
| 56 | 2,968 | 5,590 | 6,901 | 2,734 | 18,193 | 453,339 | 68837 |
| 71 | 557 | 1,114 | 2,196 | 1,061 | 4,928 | 142,489 | 22137 |
| 72 | 2,169 | 6,141 | 10,044 | 4,021 | 22,375 | 391,635 | 72688 |
| 8 | 2,870 | 4,147 | 8,826 | 2,915 | 18,758 | 791,668 | 133474 |
| # Startups | 45,444 | 67,668 | 152,232 | 52,262 | 317,606 | | |
| # Incumbents-Year | 920,051 | 1,916,827 | 3,621,351 | 1,415,447 | | 7,873,676 | |
| # Incumbents | 150,779 | 285,337 | 563,512 | 222,298 | | | 1,221,926 |

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Identification Problem: Location Sorting

Consider the following outcome equation for **startup** *i* in industry*j* **starting operations** in location *l* at time *t*

$$\mathbf{y}_{lt}^{(i,j)} = \mathbf{x}_t^{(i,j)} \boldsymbol{\beta} + \mathbf{X}_{lt}^{(j)} \boldsymbol{\theta} + \boldsymbol{\lambda}_t^{(j)} + \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_{lt}^{(i,j)}$$
(1)

 $sx_t^{(i,j)}$ firm characteristics, $X_{lt}^{(j)}$ block industrial characteristics, $\lambda_t^{(j)}$ time industry fixed-effects, $\epsilon_{lt}^{(i,j)}$ error term

The main identification problem is location sorting

Identification Problem: Location Sorting

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The main identification problem is location sorting

1. ZOOM IN: no sorting into blocks within neighborhoods

<u>exclusion restriction</u>: no sorting within neighborhoods
Bayer, Ross, and Topa (2008), Liu, Rosenthal, and Strange (2018), and Roche (2020)

2. Zoom OUT: sorting across neighborhoods

Propensity score captures the likelihood that a block is suitable for a new startup (as in Heblich et al. (2019) and Qian and Tan (2021))



Distribution of Propensity Score (Pooled)

Downtown Toronto

Propensity score captures the likelihood that a block is suitable for a new startup (as in Heblich et al. (2019) and Qian and Tan (2021))



Distribution of Propensity Score (Pooled) Downtown Toronto (Overlay Local Delivery Units)

Propensity score captures the likelihood that a block is suitable for a new startup (as in Heblich et al. (2019) and Qian and Tan (2021))



Distribution of Propensity Score (Pooled) Downtown Toronto (Overlay Forward Sorting Areas)

Use ML to groups blocks into economic neighborhoods at the industry level

Similar in spirit to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1984)'s propensity score stratification

Economic neighborhoods as spatial propensity score stratum Campusano (2021) • Algorithm Details

Use ML to groups blocks into economic neighborhoods at the industry level

Similar in spirit to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1984)'s propensity score stratification Economic neighborhoods as spatial propensity score stratum (Campusano 2021)



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Zoom IN: Local Environment and Startups

Providing random allocation within neighborhoods, adding neighborhood-year fixed effects allow us to identify the causal effects of block level environment θ within neighborhoods

$$y_{bnt}^{(i,j)} = x_t^{(i,j)}\beta + X_{bnt}^{(j)}\theta + \lambda_t^{(j)} + \delta_{nt}^{(j)} + \epsilon_{bnt}^{(i,j)}$$
(2)

-
$$y_{bnt}^{(i,j)}$$
 : revenue, employment, exit, move

- $X_{bnt}^{(j)}$: average revenue, average employment
- $x_t^{(i,j)}$: number of owners, corporate partner, years of experience, number of businesses
- controls for number of firms in the block
- Estimation: HDFE and many zeroes => PPML (Correia, Guimarães, and Zylkin 2019)

Estimating Sample

Sample: sample only considers startups subject to random block

- Opening away from residence
- In neighborhoods where startups are in different blocks

| Startups in Different Blocks | | | | | |
|------------------------------|---------|--------|-------|--------|--|
| | Calgary | Total | | | |
| 3 | 74 | 741 | 223 | 1,434 | |
| 8 | 371 | 1,163 | 310 | 2,643 | |
| 41 | 114 | 873 | 469 | 1,876 | |
| 44 | 589 | 3,259 | 1,292 | 7,171 | |
| 48 | 556 | 3,387 | 451 | 5,404 | |
| 51 | 65 | 574 | 205 | 1,001 | |
| 52 | 506 | 1,666 | 840 | 3,853 | |
| 53 | 536 | 1,823 | 1,129 | 4,913 | |
| 54 | 2,439 | 7,775 | 2,753 | 15,209 | |
| 55 | 146 | 772 | 343 | 1,510 | |
| 56 | 313 | 993 | 312 | 2,577 | |
| 71 | 81 | 394 | 77 | 667 | |
| 72 | 547 | 2,465 | 944 | 5,447 | |
| Total | 6,337 | 25,885 | 9,348 | 53,705 | |

Zoom IN: Local spillovers are positive

- Positive effects of average employment in a block
- Non conclusive effects of average revenue in a block

| (incumbents same industry) | Revenue | Employment | Alive First Year | Alive 2017 | Move Out First Year | Total Moves |
|----------------------------|----------|------------|------------------|------------|---------------------|-------------|
| Log (Average Employment) | 0.120** | 0.218*** | 0.000245 | 0.0177** | -0.159*** | -0.0304*** |
| | (0.0523) | (0.0442) | (0.00224) | (0.00625) | (0.0199) | (0.00545) |
| Log (Average Revenue) | 0.0273** | -0.0257* | 0.000503 | 0.0000189 | 0.000953 | 0.00348** |
| | (0.0129) | (0.0139) | (0.000632) | (0.00191) | (0.00479) | (0.00149) |
| Number of Startups | 30,318 | 20,675 | 29,621 | 28,989 | 19,714 | 28,528 |

Controls: Ownership structure, number of incumbents, dummy for zero activity.

FE: neighborhood year, industry-year, city-year

Std. Errors clustered at Neighborhood-Year level

Full Table

Zoom IN: Local spillovers are positive, but very local

These effects are very local

- decay quickly one block away

| | Same Block | 1st Ring 150m | 2nd Ring 225m | 3rd Ring 300m | |
|--|----------------------|---------------------|----------------------|-----------------------|--|
| End of Year Revenue | | | | | |
| Log (Average Employment Same Industry) | 0.118** | 0.0621* | -0.0230 | 0.0154 | |
| | (0.0489) | (0.0350) | (0.0508) | (0.0280) | |
| Log (Average Revenue Same Industry) | 0.0259** (0.0123) | 0.00739 (0.0133) | -0.0168* (0.0101) | -0.00138 (0.00802) | |

Each panel is one regression. Coefficients correspond to measure of variable in the first column

Decay Explained

Zoom IN: heterogenous across industries

- Employment intensive and industries benefit more from higher employment
- Knowledge intensive industries benefit more from higher average revenue

| | Information / Financial Services | Manufacturing | Professional / Business Services | Retail, Leisure and Hospitality | Transport / Wholesale Trade |
|--|--|----------------------|--|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| End of Year Revenue | | | | | |
| Log (Average Employment Same Industry) | -0.227** | 0.812*** | 0.0739 | 0.209*** | 0.340** |
| | (0.106) | (0.189) | (0.114) | (0.0459) | (0.126) |
| Log (Average Revenue Same Industry) | 0.0530** (0.0187) | -0.0802* (0.0442) | 0.0293* (0.0159) | 0.00145 (0.0129) | 0.0143 (0.0185) |

Each panel is one regression. Coefficients correspond to a dummy for a group of industries interacted with the variable in the first column.

Employment
Zoom IN: and type of industry exposure

Exposure not only to same industry

- Use of input-output weights (StatsCan 2001)
- Use of occupational similarity weights (BLS 2001)

| | Same | All | Downstream | Upstream | Occ. Similarity |
|--------------------------|----------|----------|------------|----------|--------------------|
| End of Year Revenue | | | | | |
| Log (Average Employment) | 0.120** | 0.186*** | 0.0437** | 0.0407** | 0.141*** |
| | (0.0523) | (0.0296) | (0.0147) | (0.0149) | (0.0261) |
| Log (Average Revenue) | 0.0273** | 0.0319** | 0.0907*** | 0.100*** | 0.0637*** |
| | (0.0129) | (0.0145) | (0.0130) | (0.0135) | (0.0131) |
| | . , | | | | |



Zoom IN: In Summary

In summary

Spillovers Mostly positive effects

Learning Moving less in ST and surviving more in MT

Heterogeneity Across industries and type of exposure

Decay rapidly in the space => benefits of hyper concentration

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- Neighborhood-Year fixed effects
 - control for unobserved differences across blocks within boundaries
 - without considering unobserved heterogeneity across neighborhoods
- Roy model: to correct estimates block-level spillovers for self-selection into neighborhoods

An entrepreneur expected utility V_n^i for neighborhood *n* is a function of two components

$$V_n^i = \overline{y}_n^i + t_n^i \tag{3}$$

where t_n^i is a vector of personal preferences and \overline{y}_n^i is the expected outcome of the startup,

$$\overline{\mathbf{y}}_{n}^{i} \equiv \mathsf{E}_{n}^{i} \left[\mathbf{y}_{bn}^{i} \mid \mathbf{x}^{i} \right] = \mathbf{x}^{i} \boldsymbol{\beta} + \overline{\mathbf{X}}_{n}^{i} \boldsymbol{\theta} + \mathsf{E}_{n}^{i} \left[\boldsymbol{\nu}_{bn}^{i} \mid \mathbf{x}^{i} \right]$$
(4)

in which y_{bn}^i correspond to outcome of startup *i* in block *b* of neighborhood *n*

$$y_{bn}^{i} = x^{i}\beta + X_{bn}\theta + v_{bn}^{i}$$
(5)

Expected utility V_n^i can be written in terms of population averages and an error component

$$V_n^i = V_n + e_n^i \tag{6}$$

where $V_n^i = E[y_{bn}^i | x^i] + E[t_n^i | z^i, d_n^i]$, and $e_n^i = \varepsilon_n^i + \mu_n^i$ in which

$$\overline{y}_{n}^{i} - \mathsf{E}\left[y_{bn}^{i} \mid x^{i}\right] = \varepsilon_{n}^{i}$$

$$t_{n}^{i} - \mathsf{E}\left[t_{n}^{i} \mid z^{i}, d_{n}^{i}\right] = \mu_{n}^{i}$$

leading to the following neighborhood selection rule

$$y^i_{bn}$$
 is observed iff $\max_{k
eq n} \left(V^i_n - V^i_k + oldsymbol{e}^i_n - oldsymbol{e}^i_k
ight) \leq 0$ (7

(average deviations ε_n^i from expected outcomes analogous to neighborhood-year fixed effects)

- Traditional selection correction methods require imposing severe restrictions in the sorting process (Lee and Salanié 2018)
- And become quickly untractable as the choice set increases (Vella 1998)
- Using (7) we can correct for sorting across neighborhoods by including all sub-utilities

$$y_{bn}^{i} = x^{i}\beta + X_{bn}\theta + M_{n}^{i} \times \Omega_{n} \left(V_{1}^{i} - V_{n}^{i}, V_{2}^{i} - V_{n}^{i} \dots, V_{N}^{i} - V_{n}^{i}\right) + \mu_{bn}^{i}$$
 (8)

$$\Omega_{n}\left(\bullet\right)=\mathsf{E}_{n}\left[e_{n}^{i}|V_{1}-V_{n},V_{2}-V_{n}\ldots,V_{N}-V_{n}\right]$$

 μ_n^i error term with mean zero in the conditional sample M_n^i is a dummy variable equal one if *i* chooses neighborhood *n*

- As in Dahl (2002), Mazza and van Ophem (2018), and Ransom (2021), I use an index sufficiency assumption

$$g_n \left(\varepsilon_n^i, \max_{k \in N} \left(V_n^i - V_k^i + e_n^i - e_k^i \right) | V_1 - V_n, V_2 - V_n \dots, V_N - V_n \right)$$
$$= g_n \left(\varepsilon_n^i, \max_{k \in N} \left(V_n^i - V_k^i + e_n^i - e_k^i \right) | \mathbf{P}_n^i \right) \quad (9)$$

- That leads to the following estimating equation

$$\mathbf{y}_{bnt}^{(i,j)} = \mathbf{x}^{i}\boldsymbol{\beta} + \mathbf{X}_{bnt}^{(j)}\boldsymbol{\theta} + \boldsymbol{\delta}_{nt}^{(j)} \times \lambda_{nt} \begin{pmatrix} star^{(i,j)} & home^{(i,j)} \\ \mathbf{P}_{nt} & , & \mathbf{P}_{nt} \end{pmatrix} + \boldsymbol{\omega}_{bn}^{(i,j)}$$
(10)

Two step procedure

- 1. Estimate location choice probabilities for all possible neighborhoods (and home)
 - Choice cells are too many => not feasible with current methods
 - Conditional choice model estimated using the Adam method for stochastic optimization (Kingma and Ba 2017)
 - Exclusion restriction: owners have preference for location that do not affect outcomes
- 2. Use probabilities to correct for selection into neighborhoods
 - Now we can include all startups and variation across neighborhoods

Zoom OUT: Step 1 - Neighborhood Choice Probabilities

- 1. Chosen neighborhoods are in first quintile of options
- 2. Home neighborhoods rank lower, even when they are chosen

| Variable | Mean | Std.Dev. | Min | Max |
|------------------------------------|-------|----------|------|------|
| Number of Neighborhoods | 189.6 | 178.1 | 1.0 | 573 |
| Rank of Chosen Neighborhood | 31.29 | 67.48 | 1.0 | 573 |
| Probability of Chosen Neighborhood | 0.245 | 0.345 | 0.0 | 1.0 |
| Distance of Chosen Neighborhood | 168.8 | 686.5 | 0.0 | 4570 |
| First Best Probability | 0.575 | 0.286 | 0.04 | 1.0 |
| Probability of Home | 0.691 | 0.461 | 0.0 | 1.0 |
| Rank of Home | 100.3 | 91.34 | 1.0 | 287 |

Table: Descriptive Statistics Neighborhood Choice Probabilities

Zoom OUT: Step 2 - Corrected Estimates: Revenue

- Estimates of average employment are downward biased ~25-50%
- While estimates of average revenue are upper biased ~30-40%

| (End of Year Revenue) | Uncorrected | | Distance to F | irst Residence | Distance to Prev. Residence | |
|--|-----------------------|-----------|--|-----------------------|-----------------------------|-----------|
| | Benchmark Full Sample | | Using | Using | Using | Using |
| | Sample | | star ^(i,j) P _{nt} | home ^(i,j) | star ^(i,j) | P_{-t} |
| Log (Average Employment Same Industry) | 0.120** | 0.169*** | 0.152*** | 0.176*** | 0.184*** | 0.172*** |
| | (0.0523) | (0.0197) | (0.0323) | (0.0311) | (0.0389) | (0.0362) |
| Log (Average Revenue Same Industry) | 0.0273** | 0.0381*** | 0.0299** | 0.0183** | 0.0165** | 0.0198** |
| | (0.0129) | (0.0100) | (0.0109) | (0.00699) | (0.00767) | (0.00909) |
| Number of Startups | 30,318 | 247,594 | 125,676 | 125,676 | 125,676 | 125,676 |

FE: $\delta_{nt}^{(j)} \times P_{nt}^{(i,j)}$, Industry-Year FE and City-Year FE. Same controls as benchmark regression.

Employment
 Benchmark Sample

Zoom OUT: In summary

- Large percentage of startups are founded in place of residence
- Suggest sorting might be important
 - Unless important benefits of residence
 - Evidence suggest the opposite
- Sorting into lower ranked places (including home) bias estimates
 - Benefits of concentration and hyper concentration

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- Novel way to identify spillovers while accounting location sorting
 - Within: Propensity Score + Ward (1963) = Economic neighborhoods
 - Across: Roy Model + Dahl (2002) + Neural networks = semi-parametric correction
- Spillovers are generally positive but VERY local
 - Positive effects of average employment and revenue
 - Rapid decay in the space and vary across industries and type of exposure
- Location sorting matters
 - Chosen neighborhoods are not the first best, but belong to first quantile
 - 60% chooses home but the ranking of that choice is, generally, below the median
 - Sorting downward bias estimates of employment

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Appendix

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*Estimating Sample I

| | Startups | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------|----------|---------|-----------|---------|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| | Calgary | Toronto | Vancouver | Total | | | | | | | |
| 3 | 358 | 2,218 | 907 | 4,733 | | | | | | | |
| 8 | 1,153 | 4,250 | 1,564 | 9,095 | | | | | | | |
| 41 | 371 | 2,611 | 1,318 | 5,465 | | | | | | | |
| 44 | 1,401 | 7,240 | 2,701 | 15,898 | | | | | | | |
| 48 | 1,006 | 5,832 | 967 | 9,343 | | | | | | | |
| 51 | 175 | 1,347 | 908 | 2,934 | | | | | | | |
| 52 | 1,124 | 3,877 | 2,501 | 9,498 | | | | | | | |
| 53 | 1,194 | 4,219 | 3,076 | 11,382 | | | | | | | |
| 54 | 4,501 | 13,142 | 5,812 | 27,770 | | | | | | | |
| 55 | 442 | 1,873 | 985 | 4,057 | | | | | | | |
| 56 | 755 | 2,284 | 1,089 | 5,997 | | | | | | | |
| 71 | 180 | 819 | 500 | 1,943 | | | | | | | |
| 72 | 1,229 | 5,440 | 2,413 | 12,897 | | | | | | | |
| Total | 13,889 | 55,152 | 24,741 | 121,012 | | | | | | | |

*Estimating Sample II

• Back to Estimating Sample

*Hexagon Grid Assignment

- The city is divided in a 75-meter hexagon grid cell
- Each firm is assigned to this grid cell



Figure: Hexagon Grid Cell and Rings Around

Back to Data: Where ABack to Decay Results

*Propensity Score Specification

- DMTI Data on Points of Interest
- The propensity score captures the probability that a given incumbent firm chooses block cell*b* based on its characteristics

$$# Startups_{bjt} = \beta + \sum_{POI} \beta_{POI} POI_{bt} + \sum_{POI} \beta_{MAPOI} MA_POI_{bt} + \sum_{POI} \beta_{LAND} LAND_{bt} + \sum_{LAND} \beta_{MALAND} MA_L LAND_{bt} + \sum_{POI} \beta_{X} X_{bjt} + \sum_{POI} \beta_{MA_X} MA_X MA_X K_{bjt} + \epsilon_i$$

- *POI* are points of interest, *LAND* are land uses
- X_{bjt}: attributes and composition of nearby firms and workers with
 - *Up*, *Down*, *Eq*, *Oc* based on Input-Output (StatCan) and Occupational Similarity (BLS 2001) weights
- MA(*) are measures within 1 km with distance exp decay (rho=1)
- Sample: 2002-2006

The loss of information when grouping blocks into a neighborhood $N \subset \mathcal{P}$

$$\mathcal{U}(\mathcal{N}) = \sum_{\mathsf{P}_t^u} \parallel \mathsf{P}_t^u - \overline{\mathsf{P}}_{\mathcal{N}} \parallel^2$$

where $\overline{P}_N = n^{-1} \sum_{u=1}^n P_t^u$ is the *centre of gravity* of *N* and *n* is the number of blocks in the neighborhood.

Starting from a partition $\{N_1, ..., N_l\}$ of \mathcal{P} , the loss of information when merging two neighborhoods N_u and N_v is quantified by:

$$\delta(N_{u}, N_{v}) = I(N_{u} \cup N_{v}) - I(N_{u}) - I(N_{v})$$

That, when minimized, it is equal to minimizing the variation of *within-cluster sum of squares* after merging two clusters(Ward 1963)

For a given $\mathcal{P} = \{\mathsf{P}_t^u\}_{u=1}^{\mathbf{B}}$ set of all block-level probabilities to be clustered.

1. Initialize with set of neighborhoods to be{ $N_1, ..., N_B$ } where $N_u = \{P_t^u\}$ for all u = 1, ..., B



For a given $\mathcal{P} = \{\mathbf{P}_t^u\}_{u=1}^{\mathbf{B}}$ set of all block-level probabilities to be clustered.

- 1. Initialize with set of neighborhoods to be $\{N_1, ..., N_B\}$ where $N_u = \{P_t^u\}$ for all u = 1, ..., B
- 2. Compute the dissimilarity between all pairs, that is, compute $\delta(N_u, N_v)$ for all $u < v \in \{adjacent_u\}$



For a given $\mathcal{P} = \{\mathsf{P}_t^u\}_{u=1}^{\mathbf{B}}$ set of all block-level probabilities to be clustered.

- 1. Initialize with set of neighborhoods to be $\{N_1, ..., N_B\}$ where $N_u = \{P_t^u\}$ for all u = 1, ..., B
- 2. Compute the dissimilarity between all pairs, that is, compute $\delta(N_u, N_v)$ for all $u < v \in \{adjacent_u\}$
- 3. While there is more than one neighborhood in the original set:

3.1 Merge a pair which have minimal dissimilarity

$$\delta\left(\mathbf{N}_{u'},\mathbf{N}_{v'}\right) = \min_{u' < v'} \delta\left(\mathbf{N}_{u},\mathbf{N}_{v}\right)$$

set $N_{u'} = N_{u'} \cup N_{v'}$ and remove $N_{v'}$ from the set of neighborhoods 3.2 Compute dissimilarity between $N_{u'}$ and the remaining neighborhoods in original set



For a given $\mathcal{P} = \{\mathbf{P}_t^u\}_{u=1}^{\mathbf{B}}$ set of all block-level probabilities to be clustered.

- 1. Initialize with set of neighborhoods to be $\{N_1, ..., N_B\}$ where $N_u = \{P_t^u\}$ for all u = 1, ..., B
- 2. Compute the dissimilarity between all pairs, that is, compute $\delta(N_u, N_v)$ for all $u < v \in \{adjacent_u\}$
- 3. While there is more than one neighborhood in the original set:

3.1 Merge a pair which have minimal dissimilarity

$$\delta\left(\boldsymbol{N}_{u'}, \boldsymbol{N}_{v'}\right) = \min_{u' < v'} \delta\left(\boldsymbol{N}_{u}, \boldsymbol{N}_{v}\right)$$

set $N_{u'} = N_{u'} \cup N_{v'}$ and remove $N_{v'}$ from the set of neighborhoods 3.2 Compute dissimilarity between $N_{u'}$ and the remaining neighborhoods in original set

4. The final set of neighborhoods $\{N\}$ is defined as the subset of \mathcal{P} in which the dissimilarity within (across) neighborhoods is minimized (maximized)

*Neighborhoods by industry



*Testing Neighborhoods

- Each cell is coefficient of regression of number of startups on the score
- Conditional on neighborhood fixed effects using 0.01 caliper

| | Numb | er of Startups | | |
|------------------|----------|----------------|-----------|-----------|
| Propensity Score | Toronto | Vancouver | Montreal | Calgary |
| 3 | 768.6 | -233.6 | 982.8** | 858.8 |
| | (0.55) | (-0.32) | (2.86) | (1.31) |
| 41 | -1789.4 | -1683.4 | 411.1 | 1151.1 |
| | (-1.02) | (-1.60) | (1.01) | (1.74) |
| 44 | 1358.1 | -2529.3 | 991.0 | 4255.4*** |
| | (0.63) | (-1.20) | (1.81) | (3.69) |
| 48 | 7878.5 | -1075.6 | 972.3 | 951.3 |
| | (1.93) | (-0.97) | (1.46) | (0.38) |
| 51 | 2503.0 | 719.2 | 655.0** | -316.6 |
| | (1.71) | (0.77) | (2.62) | (-0.59) |
| 52 | 1686.3 | 998.6 | 1859.7** | -61.76 |
| | (0.96) | (0.91) | (3.23) | (-0.06) |
| 53 | 6893.2** | -184.3 | 2569.1*** | -737.4 |
| | (3.27) | (-0.11) | (4.01) | (-0.52) |
| 54 | 5154.8 | -2067.6 | 4080.9*** | -1220.2 |
| | (0.67) | (-0.77) | (3.31) | (-0.19) |
| 55 | 1867.9 | 564.6 | 661.9** | 759.6 |
| | (1.83) | (1.08) | (2.72) | (1.28) |
| 56 | 3753.4* | 247.1 | 1268.9* | 1203.6 |
| | (2.33) | (0.27) | (2.00) | (0.75) |
| 71 | 2580.0* | 1083.6* | 172.4 | -216.7 |
| | (2.37) | (2.32) | (0.83) | (-0.44) |
| 72 | 2352.0 | 2783.3* | 336.8 | 761.9 |
| | (1.20) | (2.30) | (0.75) | (0.84) |

*Zoom IN: Local Environment and Startups: Revenue

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
|--|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|----------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| Log (Average Employment Same Industry) | 0.120** | 0.171*** | 0.137*** | 0.157** | 0.119** | 0.0530 | 0.143** | 0.0921** | 0.108** | 0.120** |
| | (0.0523) | (0.0416) | (0.0229) | (0.0569) | (0.0517) | (0.0673) | (0.0515) | (0.0411) | (0.0418) | (0.0526) |
| Log (Average Revenue Same Industry) | 0.0273** | 0.0351* | 0.0365** | 0.0175** | 0.0142* | 0.0527** | 0.0282** | -0.00245 | 0.0345** | 0.0273** |
| | (0.0129) | (0.0187) | (0.0134) | (0.00817) | (0.00759) | (0.0210) | (0.0128) | (0.00744) | (0.0123) | (0.0127) |
| Log (# Incumbents Same Industry) | -0.114* | -0.00935 | 0.00371 | | | -0.121 | -0.114** | 0.0357 | -0.00624 | -0.114* |
| | (0.0599) | (0.0332) | (0.0305) | | | (0.130) | (0.0572) | (0.0412) | (0.0387) | (0.0602) |
| No Incumbent Economic Activity | 0.108 | 0.299* | 0.431** | | | 0.684** | 0.116 | -0.0586 | 0.226** | 0.108 |
| | (0.134) | (0.174) | (0.166) | | | (0.241) | (0.133) | (0.0663) | (0.115) | (0.137) |
| Previous Ownership Experience | 0.0490*** | 0.0104*** | 0.0175*** | | 0.0490*** | 0.0363* | 0.0384*** | 0.102*** | 0.0481** | 0.0490*** |
| | (0.0121) | (0.00286) | (0.00395) | | (0.0122) | (0.0192) | (0.00846) | (0.0157) | (0.0157) | (0.0120) |
| Previous Industry Experience | 0.0732*** | 0.0672*** | 0.0674*** | | 0.0733*** | 0.0801*** | 0.0389*** | 0.0606*** | 0.0617*** | 0.0732*** |
| | (0.00700) | (0.00772) | (0.00502) | | (0.00706) | (0.0164) | (0.00848) | (0.00657) | (0.00493) | (0.00688) |
| Number of Owners | -0.0697 | -0.00356 | -0.0492 | | -0.0693 | -0.0751 | -0.143** | 0.0379 | -0.0137 | -0.0697 |
| | (0.0586) | (0.0629) | (0.0397) | | (0.0599) | (0.0952) | (0.0554) | (0.0760) | (0.0417) | (0.0604) |
| Corporate Partner | 0.246 | 0.248 | 0.131 | | 0.247 | -0.184 | 0.202* | 0.549** | 0.806*** | 0.246* |
| | (0.152) | (0.173) | (0.277) | | (0.154) | (0.520) | (0.116) | (0.220) | (0.153) | (0.146) |
| Family Control | 0.470** | 0.482*** | 0.556*** | | 0.470** | 0.213 | 0.631*** | 0.547*** | 0.744*** | 0.470** |
| | (0.149) | (0.120) | (0.0974) | | (0.149) | (0.254) | (0.146) | (0.0821) | (0.0868) | (0.149) |
| Number of Startups | 30,318 | 41,112 | 81,319 | 30,318 | 30,318 | 5,363 | 37,944 | 81,586 | 142,465 | 30, 318 |
| Sample | Away | Away | Away | Away | Away | | Inst. Entrants | Home | Home/Away | Away |
| Neighborhood Year FE | YES | NO | FSA | YES | YES | | YES | YES | YES | NO |
| Cluster Level | NeighYear | Year | NeighYear | NeighYear | NeighYear | | Neigh Year | NeighYear | NeighYear | Neigh |
| Industry-Year EE and City-Year EE | | | | | | | | | | - |

Industry-Year FE and City-Year FE

Back to main results

*Zoom IN: Local Environment and Startups: Employment

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) | (7) | (8) | (9) | (10) |
|--|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|----------------|-----------|------------|-----------|
| Log (Average Employment Same Industry) | 0.218*** | 0.333*** | 0.244*** | 0.252*** | 0.217*** | 0.178* | 0.220*** | 0.209*** | 0.279*** | 0.218*** |
| | (0.0442) | (0.0443) | (0.0221) | (0.0459) | (0.0460) | (0.0932) | (0.0439) | (0.0383) | (0.0269) | (0.0449) |
| Log (Average Revenue Same Industry) | -0.0257* | -0.0348** | -0.0238** | -0.0170** | -0.0150** | -0.00887 | -0.0259* | -0.0135** | -0.0212*** | -0.0257* |
| | (0.0139) | (0.0131) | (0.00758) | (0.00776) | (0.00751) | (0.0298) | (0.0139) | (0.00613) | (0.00597) | (0.0136) |
| Log (# Incumbents Same Industry) | -0.0305 | -0.117** | -0.00839 | | | -0.0290 | -0.0314 | -0.00939 | -0.0207 | -0.0305 |
| | (0.0613) | (0.0437) | (0.0225) | | | (0.0896) | (0.0605) | (0.0286) | (0.0316) | (0.0622) |
| No Incumbent Economic Activity | -0.194 | -0.233* | -0.145 | | | 0.133 | -0.192 | -0.0584 | -0.130** | -0.194 |
| | (0.171) | (0.134) | (0.0918) | | | (0.398) | (0.172) | (0.0677) | (0.0645) | (0.171) |
| Previous Ownership Experience | 0.00138 | 0.00141 | 0.00716* | | 0.00124 | 0.0950** | 0.00214 | 0.0233** | 0.00337 | 0.00138 |
| | (0.00551) | (0.00234) | (0.00419) | | (0.00531) | (0.0458) | (0.00605) | (0.0103) | (0.00533) | (0.00549) |
| Previous Industry Experience | 0.0836*** | 0.0692*** | 0.0746*** | | 0.0836*** | 0.0590*** | 0.0775*** | 0.0780*** | 0.0782*** | 0.0836*** |
| | (0.00685) | (0.00704) | (0.00407) | | (0.00684) | (0.0154) | (0.00628) | (0.00542) | (0.00405) | (0.00715) |
| Number of Owners | 0.228*** | 0.177*** | 0.117*** | | 0.229*** | 0.105 | 0.200*** | 0.0842** | 0.174*** | 0.228*** |
| | (0.0521) | (0.0518) | (0.0295) | | (0.0524) | (0.110) | (0.0483) | (0.0358) | (0.0258) | (0.0543) |
| Corporate Partner | 0.632*** | 0.565*** | -0.0247 | | 0.627*** | 0.657 | 0.539*** | 0.931* | 0.966*** | 0.632*** |
| | (0.166) | (0.156) | (0.292) | | (0.165) | (0.816) | (0.150) | (0.512) | (0.184) | (0.162) |
| Family Control | 0.114 | 0.114 | -0.0153 | | 0.103 | 0.390 | 0.0995 | -0.0844 | -0.0202 | 0.114 |
| | (0.181) | (0.153) | (0.100) | | (0.181) | (0.465) | (0.150) | (0.113) | (0.0860) | (0.184) |
| Number of Startups | 20,675 | 41,570 | 66,678 | 20675 | 20675 | 3174 | 25088 | 60,740 | 109,411 | 20,675 |
| Sample | Away | Away | Away | Away | Away | | Inst. Entrants | Home | Home/Away | Away |
| Neighborhood Year FE | YES | NO | FSA | YES | YES | | YES | YES | YES | NO |
| Cluster Level | NeighYear | Year | NeighYear | NeighYear | NeighYear | | Neigh Year | NeighYear | NeighYear | Neigh |
| Industry-Vear EE and City-Vear EE | | | | | | | | | | - |

Industry-Year FE and City-Year FE

Back to main results

*Zoom IN: Local Environment and Startups: Future

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
|--|------------------|------------|-------------------|----------------|-------------|----------------|
| | Alive First Year | Alive 2017 | Yrs Alive / (2017 | Move Out First | Total Moves | Move and Alive |
| | | | - Found. Year) | Year | | |
| Log (Average Employment Same Industry) | 0.000245 | 0.0177** | 0.00971** | -0.159*** | -0.0304*** | -0.0954*** |
| | (0.00224) | (0.00625) | (0.00385) | (0.0199) | (0.00545) | (0.0127) |
| Log (Average Revenue Same Industry) | 0.000503 | 0.0000189 | 0.000681 | 0.000953 | 0.00348** | 0.000804 |
| | (0.000632) | (0.00191) | (0.00114) | (0.00479) | (0.00149) | (0.00328) |
| Number of Startups | 29,621 | 28,989 | 29,621 | 19,714 | 28,528 | 30,318 |

Neighborhood-Year FE, Industry-Year FE and City-Year FE. Sample: Away. Controls include: number of incumbent firms, dummy of no economic activity, owners previous industry experience, owners previous entrepreneurship experience, total number of owners, dummy of corporate partner, and dummy of family control.

Back to main results

*Zoom IN: Local spillovers are positive, but very local

| | Same Block | 1st Ring 150m | 2nd Ring 225m | 3rd Ring 300m | |
|--|------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|--|
| End of Year Employment | | | | | |
| Log (Average Employment Same Industry) | 0.212*** | 0.0280 | 0.0239 | 0.0118 | |
| | (0.0428) | (0.0332) | (0.0275) | (0.0242) | |
| Log (Average Revenue Same Industry) | -0.0255* | -0.0262*** | -0.000222 | 0.00649 | |
| | (0.0139) | (0.00641) | (0.0107) | (0.00765) | |

Each panel is one regression. Coefficients correspond to measure of variable in the first column

Back

*Zoom IN: Local spillovers are positive, heterogenous across industries

| | Information / Financial Services | Manufacturing | Professional / Business Services | Retail, Leisure and Hospitality | Transport / Wholesale Trade |
|--|--|-----------------------|--|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| End of Year Employment | | | | | |
| Log (Average Employment Same Industry) | 0.000781 | 0.722*** | 0.200 | 0.202*** | 0.202* |
| | (0.234) | (0.175) | (0.131) | (0.0385) | (0.115) |
| Log (Average Revenue Same Industry) | -0.00499 (0.0283) | -0.0731** (0.0344) | -0.0370* (0.0215) | -0.0268* (0.0137) | -0.0102 (0.0200) |

Each panel is one regression. Coefficients correspond to a dummy for a group of industries interacted with the variable in the first column.



*Zoom IN: Local spillovers are positive, and type of industry exposure

| | Same | All | Downstream | Upstream | Occ. Similarity |
|--------------------------|------|----------|------------|----------|--------------------|
| End of Year Employment | | | | | |
| Log (Average Employment) | | 0.209*** | 0.0359** | 0.0379** | 0.173*** |
| | | (0.0331) | (0.0137) | (0.0137) | (0.0280) |
| Log (Average Revenue) | | -0.0101 | 0.0418** | 0.0435** | 0.000121 |
| | | (0.0173) | (0.0202) | (0.0205) | (0.0199) |
| | | | | | |



*Zoom OUT: Step 2 - Corrected Estimates: Employment

| (End of Year Employment) | Uncor | rected | Distance to F | irst Residence | Distance to Prev Residence | |
|--|-----------------------|-----------|-------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------|
| | Benchmark Full Sample | | Using | Using | Using | Using |
| | Sample | | $\operatorname{Star}^{(i,j)}$ | home ^(i,j) | star ^(i,j) | home ^(i,j) |
| | | | · nt | P _{nt} | i nt | P _{nt} |
| Log (Average Employment Same Industry) | 0.218*** | 0.316*** | 0.319*** | 0.313*** | 0.312*** | 0.294*** |
| | (0.0442) | (0.0167) | (0.0358) | (0.0396) | (0.0428) | (0.0400) |
| Log (Average Revenue Same Industry) | -0.0257* | -0.0159** | -0.0260** | -0.0223** | -0.0310** | -0.0229** |
| | (0.0139) | (0.00532) | (0.00919) | (0.0100) | (0.00986) | (0.0111) |
| Number of Startups | 20,675 | 249,938 | 88,687 | 87,760 | 89,666 | 86,325 |

FE: $\delta_{nt}^{(j)} \times P_{nt}^{(i,j)}$, Industry-Year FE and City-Year FE. Same controls as benchmark regression.

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*Zoom OUT: Step 2 - Corrected Estimates: Restricted Sample

| (End of Year Revenue) | Uncorrected | | Distance to First Residence | | Distance to Prev Residence | |
|--|-------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------|
| | Benchmark | Full Sample | Using | Using | Using | Using |
| | Sample | | star ^(i,j) | home ^(i,j) | star ^(i,j) | home ^(i,j) |
| | | | P _{nt} | P _{nt} | P _{nt} | P _{nt} |
| Log (Average Employment Same Industry) | 0.163*** | 0.169*** | 0.198*** | 0.163** | 0.136** | 0.163*** |
| | (0.0441) | (0.0449) | (0.0565) | (0.0629) | (0.0414) | (0.0487) |
| Log (Average Revenue Same Industry) | 0.0288* | 0.0249 | 0.0221 | 0.0281 | 0.0313** | 0.0356** |
| | (0.0165) | (0.0157) | (0.0172) | (0.0182) | (0.0142) | (0.0175) |
| Number of Startups | 29,250 | 29,250 | 29,250 | 29,250 | 29250 | 29,250 |

FE: $\delta_{nt}^{(j)} \times \mathbf{P}_{nt}^{(l,j)}$, Industry-Year FE and City-Year FE. Same controls as benchmark regression.

Back to Revenue Results

*Zoom OUT: Step 2 - Corrected Estimates: Restricted Sample

| (End of Year Employment) | Uncorrected | | Distance to First Residence | | Distance to Prev Residence | |
|--|-------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------|
| | Benchmark | Full Sample | Using | Using | Using | Using |
| | Sample | | star ^(i,j) | home ^(i,j) | star ^(i,j) | home ^(i,j) |
| | | | P _{nt} | P _{nt} | P _{nt} | P _{nt} |
| Log (Average Employment Same Industry) | 0.278*** | 0.262*** | 0.239*** | 0.223*** | 0.310*** | |
| | (0.0388) | (0.0430) | (0.0430) | (0.0340) | (0.0509) | |
| Log (Average Revenue Same Industry) | -0.0279** | -0.0155 | -0.0319** | -0.00536 | -0.0433** | |
| | (0.0126) | (0.0145) | (0.0129) | (0.0119) | (0.0190) | |
| Number of Startups | 17,998 | 17,576 | 17,768 | 16,932 | 17,824 | |

FE: $\delta_{nt}^{(j)} \times \mathbf{P}_{nt}^{(l,j)}$, Industry-Year FE and City-Year FE. Same controls as benchmark regression.

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